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STANDING IS No GUARANTEE FOR A GUARANTOR:
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE SPOUSAL-GUARANTOR
PROVISION OF THE ECOA
Justin Jennewine*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA
or the Act) which made it unlawful for any financial institution or other
firm engaged in the extension of credit to discriminate on the basis of
sex or marital status.1  Significant changes were made to the Act in
1976, which included the authorization of the Federal Reserve Board to
make any regulation necessary to carry out the Act's purpose.2
Collectively, these regulations are known as Regulation B.3 The Act
was, in part, a product of calls made by the National Commission on
Consumer Finance requesting a re-evaluation of the lending process in
an effort to ensure that all individuals have access to credit.4 While "the
practice of requiring a woman's husband to co-sign .. . is quickly
diminishing,"5 instances of discrimination still occur in today's credit
market.6  Specifically, cases today frequently involve instances of
husbands applying for loans that require their wives to sign as
guarantors, regardless of the husbands' creditworthiness. 7  These
practices violate Regulation B's prohibition against requiring a spouse's
signature on a credit instrument if the applicant is independently
creditworthy.8
Early on, there was little litigation regarding credit discrimination
under the ECOA. The fact that Regulation B spells out, in detail, the
* Associate Member, 2014-2015 University of Cincinnati Law Review
1. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974), codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994).
2. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976), codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1691(a).
3. See Federal Reserve Board Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1976).
4. See Andrea Farley, NOTE: The Spousal Defense-A Ploy to Escape Payment or Simple
Application of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act?, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1287, 1291 (1996) (citing NAT'L
COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN., REPORT ON CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 151 (1972)).
5. Ami L. diLorenzo, Regulation B: How Lenders Can Fight Back Against the Affirmative Use
of Regulation B, 8 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 215 (2000).
6. For an extensive analysis of specific instances of discrimination under the ECOA, see Joan
Kirshberg, Discrimination Against Credit Applicant on Basis of Marital Status under Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1691), 55 A.L.R. FED. 458 (1981).
7. The guarantor of a loan is an individual who promises to be responsible for the debt or
obligation of another individual.
8. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1). The spouse is permitted to sign as a guarantor, but the lender
cannot require that the spouse's signature be on the instrument.
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types of information that can and cannot be asked of an applicant likely
is the main reason that courts have not experienced a flood of litigation
stemming from the ECOA. 9 However, in the past decade, district court
cases interpreting and applying the ECOA and the regulations
accompanying it have been on the rise. Cases being brought before the
courts consider questions such as the proper remedy available to a
guarantor for an ECOA violation and whether a guarantor can assert an
ECOA defense even after the statute of limitations has expired. 10
Recent federal court cases have challenged the assumption that a
guarantor has standing to bring a claim under the ECOA. Specifically,
courts are questioning the amount of deference that should be given to
the Federal Reserve Board's decision to expand the scope of the Act to
include guarantors as "applicants" under the ECOA. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals" and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 12 have
varying interpretations with vastly different consequences on
guarantors' rights. This Casenote seeks to answer the question of
whether a guarantor has standing under the ECOA because of the
Federal Reserve Board's decision that a guarantor is considered an
applicant.
Part II of this Casenote explores the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by
analyzing the history, purpose, adaptation, interpretation, and
enforcement of the legislation. Part III explores the existing case law,
focusing on the contentious issue of standing in district and state courts,
the decisions of the split circuit courts, and the rationale behind the
courts' varying interpretations of the law. Part IV explains how the
Sixth Circuit was correct in giving the Federal Reserve Board's
definition deference, reviews the failures of the Eighth Circuit's
decision, and offers a prediction about the future of Regulation B.
Finally, Part V provides a summary of the existing state of the law and
explores the future implications of the ECOA.
9. See Ralph J. Rohner, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 34 BUs. LAw. 1423, 1424 (1979)
(discussing reasons why the Truth in Lending Act has produced an explosion of litigation but the ECOA
produced relatively little during its first four years in effect).
10. Empire Bank v. Dumond, No. 13-CV-0388-CVE-PJC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169984, at
*10 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 3, 2013) (deciding if the statute of limitations should be tolled for guarantors
claiming an ECOA defense), summary judgment granted in part, denied in part, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1179
(N.D. Okla. 2014), mot. denied, 13-CV-0388-CVE-PJC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93737 (N.D. Okla. July
10, 2014); Bank of the West v. Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453, 454 (Iowa 2010) (determining whether the
ECOA can be used as an affirmative defense to an action by a creditor).
11. RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 386 (6th
Cir. 2014) (finding that guarantors were applicants and therefore have standing).
12. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.
Ct. 1492 (2015) (finding that the Federal Reserve Board's definition of applicant should not be given
deference and therefore guarantors lack standing).
[VOL. 84
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II. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS AND ENFORCEMENT
A. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Social change throughout the 1960s served as the backdrop for the
inception of the ECOA in 1974. In a report released by the National
Commission on Consumer Finance in 1972 (the Commission), the
widespread problem 13  of gender-based credit discrimination was
exposed. 14  The Commission discovered that married women
experienced great difficulty obtaining loans without the presence of their
husband's signature, even if they did not represent a significant credit
risk.15 Congress quickly focused its efforts on correcting the lending
procedure to eliminate any discriminatory practices aimed at women
and, at one point, considered drafting the bill so that it would not
address any class other than women. 
16
Congress's solution to issues of discrimination was the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act. 17 Passed in 1974, the Act made it "unlawful for any
creditor to discriminate against any applicant on the basis of sex or
marital status with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction."'1 8 The
Act defined an applicant as "any person who applies to a creditor
directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, or applies to
a creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an amount
exceeding a previously established credit limit."' 9 However, two years
later, Congress found it necessary to provide protection for a broader
class of people, and therefore, amended the Act to prohibit
discrimination against applicants based on race, color, religion, national
13. Discriminatory practice employed by credit providers included but were not limited to
assigning a value to sex or marital status, asking women about their use of birth control and ability to
have children, discounting income earned by women, perceptions that income from alimony or child
support was too unreliable, varying terms of credit, and requiring women recently married to reapply for
loans received when they were single. See Earl M. Maltz & Fred H. Miller, The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act and Regulation B, 31 OKLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1978).
14. See Farley, supra note 4 (citing Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of
the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 93d. Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)).
15. Anne J. Geary, Equal Credit Opportunity - An Analysis of Regulation B, Bus. LAW. 31,1641
at 1652-53 (Apr. 1976).
16. See Farley, supra note 4, at 1289 n.] I (citing Subcommittee Hearings, 93d. Cong., 2d Sess.
at 317-18 (1974)).
17. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974), codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994).
18. 1d. § 701(a).
19. Id. § 702(b).
20. It should be noted that this is the first expansionary policy applied to the ECOA and
Regulation B by either Congress or the Federal Reserve Board. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act
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origin, age, and "for other purposes." 21
The ECOA protects debtors by preventing discrimination against an
applicant simply because the applicant is a member of a specified class
of people. 22  Any analysis of the Act also should be done with an
understanding that its scope is considerably broader than other
comparable consumer credit protection regulations 23 such as the Truth
in Lending Act or the Consumer Leasing Act. 24
B. Regulation B
The Act gives the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (the
Bureau) the authority to "prescribe regulations" to carry out the
purposes of the Act.2 5 This grant of power gave the Bureau authority to
draft Regulation B. 26 Regulation B was implemented to offer creditors
details on which practices are and are not appropriate under the Act.
27
Additionally, the Federal Reserve Board published "model application
forms that creditors could adopt or adapt" to reduce the risk of a
violation of the Act. Regulation B prohibits inquiries regarding race,
marital status, sex, and age on the premise that "if creditors cannot
inquire about or note applicants' personal characteristics . . . they are
less likely unlawfully to consider the information in connection with a
credit transaction. ' 29  Regulation B also includes a spousal-guarantor
provision which expressly prohibits requiring the signature of a spouse
if the applicant is individually creditworthy.3
Throughout its existence, Regulation B largely has remained
21. The "other purposes" that the act refers to are elaborated on in the text of the act and include
discrimination against an applicant because all or part of their income is derived from a public assistance
program or because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit
Protection Act. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976), codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1691(a). Additional changes have been made to the Act through amendments in 1991 and
2010.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a).
23. See Earl M. Maltz & Fred H. Miller, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B, 31
OKLA. L. REv. 1,2-3 (1978).
24. The Truth in Lending Act was passed in 1968 and is designed to promote the informed use of
credit by requiring that creditors disclose terms and costs to consumers regarding credit transactions.
The Consumer Leasing Act, passed in 1976, requires that certain provisions be in lease agreements for
personal property lasting longer than four months.
25. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 169lb(a) (2010).
26. Regulation B of the ECOA, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1975).
27. See Rohner, supra note 9.
28. Id.
29. Equal Credit Opportunity, 68 Fed. Reg. 13144, 13147. Regulation B also prohibits creditors
from asking applicants about their childbearing capabilities, their former spouses, or any child support
payments they may receive. Id. at 13164.
30. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1).
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unchanged. However, since its creation in 1976, the language of
Regulation B has been revised slightly by amendments passed in 1985
and 2003. These amendments were designed to expand the number of
individuals covered by the Act and provide more protection to those
who fall under its authority.
In the 1985 amendment, Congress modified the definitions of several
key terms. 31 The most frequently discussed change is to the definition
of the term "applicant". 32  While the definitions used in the original
version of Regulation B were similar to those used by Congress in the
Act, 33 this amendment made substantive changes to the definition of the
term applicant as it applied in Regulation B.q4 Under Regulation B's
original definition of applicant, guarantors were expressly excluded
from protection under the Act.35 The 1985 amendment to Regulation B,
however, expanded the definition of applicant to explicitly include
guarantors. 36- The broadening of this definition has sparked debate in
courts at both the state and federal levels and has resulted in new claims
brought under the ECOA.
While the Board has had opportunities to return to the original
definition of applicant since the 1985 amendment-most notably, a
rejected proposal in 1995 and an amendment passed in 2003-it has
refused to do so. In fact, the only significant change to Regulation B
since 1985 was an amendment passed in 2003 that expanded the form of
"self-checks" that a creditor can perform to ensure the creditor is not
engaging in discriminatory practices. 37  The most recent change to
Regulation B occurred in 2010 when Congress shifted authority over
Regulation B from the Federal Reserve Board to the Bureau of
3 1. Both the ECOA and Regulation B have sections that define important words. The changes
made in 1985 were made to the definitions section of Regulation B. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.2.
32. See Equal Credit Opportunity; Revision of Regulation B, 50 Fed. Reg. 48018 (Nov. 20,
1985) (also making changes to the phrase "empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound,
credit scoring system").
33. Compare Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) and Regulation B of the
ECOA, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e).
34. See Equal Credit Opportunity; Revision of Regulation B, 50 Fed. Reg. 48018 (Nov. 20,
1985) (also making changes to the phrase "empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound,
credit scoring system").
35. See Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e)(1985)).
36. "Applicant means any person who requests or who has received an extension of credit from a
creditor, and includes any person who is or may become contractually liable regarding an extension of
credit. For purposes of § 202.7(d), the term includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers and similar parties."
50 Fed. Reg. 48018.
37. A self-test, as defined by 12 C.F.R. § 202.15(b)(1)(i), is "any program, practice, or study
that: [i]s designed and used specifically to determine the extent or effectiveness of a creditor's
compliance with the Act or this regulation."
2016]
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Consumer Financial Protection.38
Since its creation in 1976, the language of Regulation B has been
expanded by the amendments passed in 1985 and 2003. These
amendments led to the inclusion of more individuals covered and the
provision of more protections to those who fall under its authority.
However, not all people protected under the Act and Regulation B have
access to the same remedies.
C. Claims under the Equal Protection Act
Even though the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection has the
power to promulgate regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of
the Act, the Bureau is not granted exclusive responsibility to enforce
it. 39 The Act provides a list of federal agencies that are responsible for
the enforcement of the ECOA within the scope of their regulatory
authority. 4° For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission has
the power to enforce the ECOA with respect to brokers and dealers
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.41 Additionally,
"[e]xcept to the extent that enforcement of the requirements imposed
under [the Act] is specifically committed to some other Government
agency," general enforcement authority is reserved for the Federal Trade
42Commission (the FTC). Accordingly, the FTC and the eleven listed
government agencies have authority to make rules respecting their own
procedures when enforcing compliance with the Act. 43
Any creditor who fails to comply with the provisions of the ECOA is
subject to civil liability in suits brought by individual plaintiffs or a class
of plaintiffs.44 If there is reason to believe that a creditor has developed
a pattern of noncompliance with the Act, the case can be referred to the
Attorney General, and the creditor may be held liable for further
damages. The United States district courts have jurisdiction over any
38. Equal Credit Opportunity Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 2083,
(2010), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691b.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c.
40. Acts (and enforcing agencies) subject to the provisions of the ECOA include the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (Federal Savings Association, Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation), Federal Credit Union Act (Administrator of the National Credit Union
Administration), Acts to regulate commerce (Secretary of Transportation), Federal Aviation Act
(Secretary of Transportation), Packers and Stockyards Act (Secretary of Agriculture), Farm Credit Act
(Farm Credit Administration), Securities Exchange Act (Securities and Exchange Commission), Small
Business Investment Act (Small Business Administration), and the Consumer Financial Protection Act
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection). 15 U.S.C. § 1691 c(a)(l)-(9).
41. 15 U.S.C. §1691(c)(a)(7)
42. Seeid. § 1691c(c).
43. Seeid. § 1691c(d).
44. 12 C.F.R. § 202.16(b)(1).
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claim made under the ECOA, so long as that claim is made within the
prescribed five-year statute of limitations period.45
After initiation of a wrongful action, the Act allows the aggrieved
applicant to seek recovery of actual damages, putative damages,
equitable and declaratory relief, and recovery of costs and attorney
fees. 46 Most importantly, however, before any potential plaintiff can
consider herself an aggrieved applicant under the protection of the
ECOA, she must first show that she is an "applicant" with standing to
bring suit. Although the definitions in the Act and Regulation B may
seem straightforward, differing interpretations have resulted in a
considerable amount of litigation.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A plaintiff must have standing to bring suit under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act. Prior to the 1985 amendment to the definition of
"applicant" in Regulation B, the only person with standing was the
person who applied for-and received-the benefit of the credit.
However, changing the definition of "applicant" broadened the scope of
the Act to include anyone who "may become contractually liable ...
includ[ing] guarantors. ' 47 Initially, courts accepted this amendment and
assumed that guarantors had standing to bring suit. However, recent
judicial opinions have questioned the Board's authority to change the
definition of "applicant" and have found that the alteration may not
warrant deference because it contravenes the intent of Congress. This
dispute has reached its climax, culminating in a circuit split between the
Eighth Circuit48 and the Sixth Circuit.
49
A. The Eighth Circuit Decision
Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore50 rose to the Eighth Circuit
on appeal from the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiff, Valerie
Hawkins, is the wife of Gary Hawkins. Mr. Hawkins is one of two
members of a Missouri limited liability company, PHC Development,
45. Regardless of the amount in controversy, United States federal courts always have
jurisdiction over claims under the ECOA. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f).
46. However, the putative damages that a plaintiff is able to collect are limited to "an amount not
greater than $10,000." Id. § 1691e(b).
47. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e).
48. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct.
1492 (2015).
49. RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 382 (6th
Cir. 2014).
50. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 937.
2016]
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LLC. 5 1 The plaintiff had no interest in the company her husband
owned. Between 2005 and 2008, the defendant, Community Bank of
Raymore (Community), made four loans totaling over $2 million to
PHC to fund the development of a subdivision. For each loan, the
plaintiff and her husband executed personal guaranties to secure the
loans. 
54
PHC failed to meet the obligations of the loan. As a result, the
defendant declared the loans in default and sought recovery from the
plaintiff and her husband as guarantors. 55 The plaintiff filed suit against
the bank, claiming that Community had violated the ECOA by requiring
her to execute personal guaranties on the loans solely by reason of her
marriage to Mr. Hawkins. 56 The plaintiff sought damages in addition to
an order from the court declaring that the guaranties were void and
unenforceable. 57  The district court awarded summary judgment to
Community, and Hawkins appealed.58
On appeal, Community argued that Mrs. Hawkins was not within the
class of persons protected by the ECOA because she was not an
"applicant" under the language of the Act. 59 In essence, the issue on
appeal was whether the protections of the ECOA allowed a guarantor to
seek recovery for marital-status discrimination under the Act. The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, finding that "a
guarantor is not protected from marital-status discrimination by the
ECOA"60 because a guarantor is not an applicant and, therefore, the
guarantor does not have standing to bring suit.
The appellate court recognized that the 1985 amendment to
Regulation B did revise the statutory definition of applicant to extend
protection to guarantors. 61 However, the court determined that the
Board was acting in direct conflict with the intention of Congress by
broadening the definition in Regulation B.62  If the definition from
Regulation B were afforded deference, then Mrs. Hawkins-as a
guarantor-would be permitted to bring suit under the Act. On the other
51. Henceforth known as "PHC." Id. at 939.
52. Id.
53. Each loan was modified several times as well. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 939.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 940.
59. See Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 22, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937
(8th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-3065).
60. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 942.
61. Id. at 940.
62. See generally id.
[VOL. 84
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hand, if the definition were not given deference, then her claim would be
barred due to her lack of standing. To reach a decision, the court
applied the two-step framework for statutory interpretation established
by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.63
In Chevron, the Supreme Court reviewed the regulation promulgated
by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1981 interpreting the
definition of "stationary source" as it was used in the Clean Air Act
Amendment of 1977.64 The Court sought to determine if the
interpretation was within the scope envisioned by Congress when the
65Clean Air Act was originally passed. The Chevron Court noted at the
outset that any judicial review of an agency's construction of a statute
begins with two threshold questions. The first question confronting a
court is "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. ' 67  If congressional intent is clear, then the inquiry ends there.
However, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute."" If an
interpretation meets both of these conditions, deference should be given
to the agency's interpretation because of its granted authority to create
regulation for the effective administration of the Act.
In Hawkins, the Eighth Circuit examined whether there was clear
congressional intent in determining who qualified as an applicant. With
all three judges in agreement, 69 the three-page opinion of the court
concluded that "[b]ecause the text of the ECOA is unambiguous. . . we
will not defer to the Federal Reserve's interpretation of applicant . .. " 70
In support of their conclusion, the Eighth Circuit pointed to dicta from
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-
Atlantic Market Development Co., LLC.71 Moran found that "there is
nothing ambiguous about 'applicant' and no way to confuse an applicant
with a guarantor." 72 Moreover, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits feared
63. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
64. The 1977 amendment imposes certain requirements on states that have not achieved the
national air quality standards established by the EPA.
65. See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
66. Id. at 842.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 843.
69. One judge wrote a concurring opinion. See Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d
937, 943-45 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015) (Colloton, J., concurring).
70. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 942.
71. Id. at 942 (referencing Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., LLC, 476 F.3d 436
(7th Cir. 2007). Moran dealt with a franchisor of a grocery store trying to collect a loan provided to the
franchisee after the franchisee lost the store to bankruptcy. The franchisee and his wife both guarantied
the loan personally.
72. Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., LLC, 476 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2007).
2016]
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interpreting "applicant" to include guarantors because it might "open
vistas of liability" that the ratifying Congress would not have been
willing to accept. 73
The Eighth Circuit's decision drew support from preceding district
court decisions that denied the Board's interpretation of an applicant.
The workability of the Board's interpretation of "applicant" was
challenged by the Eastern District of Missouri in Champion Bank v.
Regional Development, LLC.74 The court asserted that a wife, claiming
she was wrongly made a guarantor, could not seek recovery under the
Act. 75 The court reasoned that the complainant cannot seek the method
of recovery reserved for a protected class of people while
simultaneously claiming that she is not part of that protected class of
76people. The court rejected the claim saying that the circular and
illogical results prevented a remedy, thus making it impossible for the
wife to be made whole by the Act. 77
B. The Sixth Circuit Decision
In RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Common Development
Group, LLC,78 the Sixth Circuit was confronted with a case that raised
the same legal issues presented in Hawkins. In Bridgemill, the
defendants, Starr Stone Dixon (Starr) and H. Bernard Dixon (Bernard),
are husband and wife. Bernard invested millions of dollars in two
residential developments, one of which was named Bridgemill
Commons, through loans received by BCDG-a company Bernard had
created to purchase the Bridgemill Commons Development. 79
However, the financial crisis in 2008 yielded nearly $10 million in
losses on this investment. 80  Bernard approached BB&T Bank about
refinancing his debt on both investments, and provided detailed financial
information on both himself and his wife. 8 '
BB&T appraised the Bridgemill investment and valued it at $5.65
million.82 As a result of the appraisal, BB&T concluded that "Bernard
73. Id.
74. See generally Champion Bank v. Reg'l Dev., LLC, No. 4:08CV1807, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40468 (E.D. Mo. May 13, 2009).
75. See id. at *8.
76. See id. at *8-9.
77. See id. at *8.
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and BCDG were not independently creditworthy for a loan large enough
to refinance" the loans on both investments. 83 In an effort to bolster the
loan, Bernard and Starr each pledged 40,000 shares of BB&T stock,
84
and Bernard executed a personal guaranty on the loan. While the parties
dispute how Starr became personally liable for the loan,85 Starr testified
that she felt tremendous pressure from the bank to sign the personal
guaranty. In addition, a summary of the loan requirements offered at
trial stated "Starr will be required to co-sign the notes .... 86 On June
4, 2008, the loan was processed and BCDG issued a note to BB&T for a
final value of $6.4 million. 87
The note came due on June 5, 2010, and by that date, the defendants
had paid less than $2 million towards the principal sum. After a series
of transfers, RL BB Acquisition, LLC acquired the rights to collect on
the guaranties offered by Starr and her husband. The plaintiff asserted
five causes of action at trial including a breach of guaranty claim against
Starr. 8  Both Starr and the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on
the matter, and the district court found that while the amount of damages
was unresolved, the plaintiff had proven that Starr was liable under the
guaranty. 89  Starr timely appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 90
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit began its analysis by
recognizing that the Act's protections and remedies only were available
to "applicants" for credit. Noting that the "ordinary tools of statutory,,92
construction should be used, the Sixth Circuit applied the test
articulated in Chevron. 9
3
To analyze whether Congress had directly addressed the issue, the
Court focused on two terms within the language of the Act: "applies"
and "credit." 94 The term "apply" is defined as the following: "to make
83. Id.
84. Starr owned her 40,000 shares of stock independently. Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 382.
85. The BB&T representative claims that Bernard suggested that Starr execute a personal
guaranty, but Bernard claims that the representative required Starr to execute the guaranty. Id.
86. Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 383
89. Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 383.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 384.
92. Id. (citing City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (referencing the
fact that courts have "long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
93. Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 384 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
94. Id. at 385.
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an appeal or request esp[ecially] formally and often in writing and
usu[ally] for something of benefit to oneself' 95 or "to make an approach
to (a person) for information or aid; to have recourse or make
application to, to appeal to; to make a (formal) request for." 96 The court
found that the definition created ambiguity with regard to the intent of
Congress; while guarantors do not usually approach lenders asking for
credit for themselves, "a guarantor does formally approach a creditor in
the sense that the guarantor offers up [his or] her own personal liability.
if the borrower defaults."
97
Additionally, the court found that the term "credit" further obfuscates
any congressional intent through its definition in the ECOA: "the right
,98granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt .... The
applicant approaches the lender to request credit but it is the debtor who
reaps the benefit of using the credit.9 9 As a result, the court found it
possible that "[t]he use of these two different terms suggests that the
applicant and the debtor are not always the same person." 100  The
ambiguity present in both terms is sufficient to support a finding that
Congress never directly spoke to this issue.
The next step in the Chevron test is to determine whether the
regulation stems from a permissible construction of the statute.
10 1
Given that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme," the court found that
the Board's interpretation of an applicant was one of the "natural
meanings" of an "applicant."' 102  Having found that both steps of the
Chevron test were satisfied, the court concluded that the Board's
interpretation should be afforded deference. 10 3  Therefore, the court
concluded that the district court erred in finding that Starr could not seek
relief under the spousal-guarantor rule of the ECOA. 1
04
95. Id. (citing Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 105 (1993) (brackets in original)).
96. Id. (citing Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2008), available at
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9724) (internal brackets and emphasis omitted).
97. Id. at 385.
98. Id. at 385 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(d)).
99. Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 385.
100. Id.
101. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
102. See Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 385-86 (citing Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 467 (6th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
103. Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 386. The Sixth Circuit's finding is in line with the Supreme Court of
Iowa in Bank of the West v. Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa 2010); the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in Integra Bank v. Freeman, 839 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1993); the Northern District of Oklahoma in
Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Bulk Petroleum Corp., No. 08-CV-654-TCK-PJC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106495 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 5, 2010); and the Third Circuit in Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor
Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1995).
104. See Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 386.
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IV. ANALYSIS
This section of the Casenote will briefly review the circuit courts'
application of the Chevron test. This analysis will determine that the
Sixth Circuit is correct, the Board's interpretation of the definition of an
applicant complies with the requirements of statutory interpretation, and
that courts should afford deference to the Board's interpretation.
Additionally, this section will consider the policy promoted by the Act
and discuss the threat to those policy concerns if the Eighth Circuit's
reasoning is adopted as controlling law. Finally, this section briefly will
speculate on the future of Regulation B, including the appropriate
avenues for resolution of disputes in this issue of law.
A. The Federal Reserve Board's Amendment to the Definition of
Applicant Deserves Deference.
The courts in Hawkins and Bridgemill correctly concluded that the
Chevron test must be employed to determine if a regulatory agency's
statutory interpretation should be afforded deference. The Sixth
Circuit's analysis correctly found that the Board's definition should be
afforded deference while the Eighth Circuit incorrectly found the statute
unambiguous and therefore did not give deference to the Board. The
Chevron test begins with the determination of whether Congress has
directly spoken to the specific issue at hand. 
105
1. Congress Has Not Directly Spoken to the Specific Issue at Hand.
For a statutory interpretation to fail this portion of the test, Congress
must have spoken directly to the issue interpreted by the regulatory
agency. Additionally, the intent of Congress must be "unambiguously
expressed."' 106  However, if any ambiguity exists, Congress is
deemednot to have spoken directly about the issue.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that Congress's intent was
unambiguous with regard to the definition of an "applicant." The court
found that the expansion of the term applicant was inappropriate when
using the definition of the term "apply" as given in Webster's Third
New International Dictionary. 10 7  Through this definition, the Eighth
Circuit determined that the "plain language ... unmistakably provides
105. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
106. Id. at 843.
107. See Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015) (defining "apply" as "to make an appeal or request especially formally and often
in writing and usually for something of benefit for oneself") (internal brackets omitted).
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that a person is an applicant only if she requests credit." 10 8  This
perception ignores the distinct possibility that an individual can request
credit to be provided to another person-much the same way guarantors
offer their assets in support of the issuance of credit to the debtor.
However, the Sixth Circuit approached the same question and found
that the expanded definition was appropriate. The court began the
analysis by examining the definitions of the language used in the
statute-specifically, the definition of "applies" and "credit."
' 10 9
Ultimately, the court concluded that under the language of the Act, an
applicant is a party that requests credit while a debtor is the party that
reaps the benefits of the credit. 110 There is overlap in the definitions of
these terms and their separate use suggests that the applicant and the
debtor may not always present as the same individual Therefore,
"[i]f an applicant is not necessarily the debtor, it would be reasonable to
conclude that the applicant could be a third party, such as a
guarantor."' l l2 The overlapping definition of these terms presents the
same problem considered in Chevron. There, the Supreme Court found
that the statute's overlapping terms and imprecise language directed at
the applicability of the terms were indications that the terms "intended
to enlarge, rather than to confine, the scope of the agency's power...
,,113 The same reasoning applies with respect to the definition of
"applicant." It is reasonable to conclude that this overlap indicates that
Congress intended to enlarge the Board's authority. The interpretation
of the terms "applies" and "credit" within the Act clearly creates
ambiguity when compared to the finding of the Eighth Circuit.
Reading the congressional history of the Act reveals that Congress
neither contemplated nor foresaw a situation where spouses would
needlessly be brought in to the credit transaction. 114  Indeed, the
spousal-guarantor provision is not mentioned in the language of the Act.
Yet, it is exclusively provided for in Regulation B. Therefore, the
spousal-guarantee was created by the regulatory agency, not Congress.
This offers further support for the conclusion that the extension of the
word "applicant" with respect to the spousal-guarantee provision was
not specifically spoken to or considered by Congress and, thus, its
108. Id.
109. See supra note 97 and accompanying text for more of a discussion on the court's analysis.




113. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984).
114. See Farley, supra note 4, at 1290 (Congress only expressed an intention to stop the
discriminatory exclusion of women from the credit process.).
115. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1).
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intention is ambiguous.
Finally, proof of Congress's intent can be gleaned from the 2010
amendment to the Act. In 2010, Congress made extensive changes to
the Act including a revision of the amount of information that must be
collected from certain lenders. Despite the opportunity to make any
changes or clarifications with regard to the Act's interpretation,
Congress chose not to correct the Board's then fifteen-year-old
modification of the term applicant. If an agency makes an interpretation
of a law, and subsequent amendments do not "correct the misapplication
of [] Congress's intent," this choice reveals strong evidence that the
regulators were correct. 116 Drawing on the Sixth Circuit's analysis, not
only is there ambiguity in Congress's intent with regard to applicants,
but Congress's failure to address the issue in the 2010 amendment can
be interpreted as tacit agreement with the Board.
The Board's interpretation of an "applicant" satisfies the first prong
of the Chevron test because there is, at the very least, no direct
expression of intent made by Congress that is not subject to ambiguity.
This ambiguity gives the Board authority to fill any gaps left b
Congress in an effort to carry out the purpose of the Act. 11
Additionally, it can be deduced that Congress agreed with the Board's
interpretation by their inaction when they had an opportunity to correct
any misapplications of the Act.
2. The Regulation Stems from a Permissible Construction of the Statute.
For a statutory construction to be permissible, it is not necessary to
"conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly
could have adopted." 118 Neither is it required that a court hearing a
claim on the issue agree with the agency construction of the statutory
language. 119 The second step of the Chevron analysis merely requires
that "at least one of the natural meanings of applicant includes
guarantors." 1
20
Demonstrating that an interpretation is permissible is not a
challenging task. The Supreme Court has recognized that it is within the
power of a regulatory agency to "fill any gap left [within a statute],
116. Patrick Gregory, Loan Guarantors Not Protected from Marital-Status Discrimination, 83
U.S.L.W. 207 (2014) (quoting an Aug. 8, 2014 interview with John M. Duggan).
117. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
118. Alliance for Cmty. Media v. F.C.C., 529 F.3d 763, 778 (6th Cir. 2008).
119. Id.
120. RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 385-86
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implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." 121 Because the statutory language
is ambiguous regarding the extension of the term applicant to include
guarantors, the Federal Reserve Board was permitted to fill the gap. The
only requirement placed on the Board is that the regulation must be
1 22reasonable. The Board's interpretation of an applicant is reasonable
because the definition of apply can include a third party such as a
guarantor. 123
In addition to being rational, the interpretation is narrowly tailored
and thus indicative of the great care and consideration exercised in its
adoption. The Board drafted the 1985 amendment to the definition of
applicant with substantial caution. 124  The first proposal of the 1985
amendment interpreted all guarantors as applicants, which would have
given all guarantors standing to sue under the Act. 125  However, the
final version only expanded the definition to include a spousal-
guarantor. 126 The Board took care to expand the definition of applicant
to include guarantors that were subject to discrimination while
maintaining the integrity of the Act by not granting all guarantors
standing to bring suit. Because the interpretation is reasonable and
narrowly tailored to serve the purpose for which it was created, the
statutory interpretation is permissible under part two of the Chevron test.
The expansion of the definition of applicant to cover guarantors under
the spousal-guaranty provision of Regulation B should be afforded
deference because the regulation fills a gap implicitly left by Congress
and is a permissible construction of the statute. While this conclusion
directly rejects the Eighth Circuit's decision, this finding is in line with
most other courts across the country. 127 The court in Moran, which the
Eight Circuit primarily rests its argument on, offers little more than an
off-handed dismissal of the definition contained within Regulation B.
128
Moran also does not attempt to provide a competing interpretation of the
regulation.129  The Sixth Circuit's holding in Bridgemill is a more
thorough application of the Chevron test and reaches the appropriate
result by finding that the Board's definition of applicant deserves
121. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
122. See Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012).
123. For the definitions of "apply," see supra notes 95, 96, and accompanying text.
124. See Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 386.
125. See Equal Credit Opportunity; Revision of Regulation B, 50 Fed. Reg. 48018 (Nov. 20,
1985).
126. Id. The Board reasoned that the special relationship between spouses warranted additional
protection from the Act.
127. See Empire Bank v. Dumond, No. 13-CV-0388-CVE-PJC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169984
(N.D. Okla. Dec. 3,2013).
128. Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., LLC, 476 F.3d 436,441 (7th Cir. 2007).
129. See Bridgemill, 754 F.3d at 386.
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deference from the courts.
B. The Eighth Circuit's Interpretation of Who Is an Applicant Threatens
the Purpose of the Act.
Not only was it improper for the Eighth Circuit to deny deference to
the Board's interpretation of applicant, accepting the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of applicant creates serious problems with the Act.
Adopting the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit undercuts the authority and
expertise of the regulatory agency, adversely affects the financial
independence of women, and diminishes the Act's ability to achieve its
purpose.
1. The Regulatory Agency Has the Authority and Expertise to
Appropriately Enforce the Act.
Congress entrusted the Board with the responsibility of assuring that
the Act achieved its purpose for over forty years. Over that time, the
Board amended Regulation B just three times. The Federal Reserve
Board has extensive experience overseeing credit transactions and
monetary policy and procedures. The Board was given its authority
because it was deemed objectively qualified by Congress to oversee this
Act. Regulation B and its subsequent amendments were attempts by the
Board to further the purpose of the Act. Therefore, courts should
respect the expertise of the Board when the action of the Board comes
into question.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a regulatory agency's
construction of a statutory scheme should be accorded considerable
weight. " Additionally, the purpose behind Congressional delegation to
a regulatory agency is that Congress cannot attend to the requirements
of the administration of the Act. The administration requires frequent
updating of the provisions of the Act and capable handling of modem
issues unforeseen at the time of the Act's inception. Passing this
responsibility to Congress likely would lead to neglectful administration
and ultimately fail to provide meaningful protection to borrowers.
By expanding the definition of "applicant," the Board sought to
protect the right of spousal choice and provide a remedy for guarantors
when creditors violate this right. The expansion was intended to update
the Act to protect women against modem forms of discrimination.
Economic gains made by women as a result of the ECOA would have
been jeopardized had the 1985 amendment to Regulation B not been
130. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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passed. Without the freedom to pass regulation that will withstand
judicial review, the regulatory agency cannot promulgate regulation as
the Act proscribes. The regulatory agency must be able to act as a
stand-in for Congress, and courts must permit the agency to enact
regulation in furtherance of the Act's purpose. The expertise and
experience of the Board makes it the most qualified party to interpret the
statutory language of the Act. 131 By rejecting the Board's interpretation
of applicant, the Eighth Circuit not only risks the efficient
administration of the Act, but also cheapens the grant of power given to
the Board.
2. Denying Standing to Guarantors Risks the Financial Independence of
Women.
With certain exceptions, if an applicant offers a qualified person other
than a spouse to guarantee their loan, creditors are required to allow that
choice. Requiring a spouse to guarantee a loan merely because of their
marital status threatens the financial security of women. The threat to
the financial independence of a woman has significant ramifications in
both the woman's present and future credit standing.
A guarantor is an integral part of the credit process. Guarantors
provide security to the lender and make the issuance of credit more
feasible. But, to require a wife to subject herself to liability when she
has no connection to the loan places the wife at risk of long-term
financial harm. Business loans, like those issued in Hawkins and
Bridgemill, often are granted for large sums of money and require that
the debtor offer a significant amount of collateral to ensure the loan is
profitable for the bank. If the debtor defaults, the spousal-guarantor will
be required to pay back the value of the loan. This shifts tremendous
financial responsibility off of the debtor and on to the spousal-guarantor.
The short term financial burden of the spousal-guarantor can also lead
to significant long-term effects on the guarantor's financial well-being.
This most easily can be seen through a hypothetical situation where a
wife wrongfully is made a guarantor to a loan on which her husband
later defaults. By signing a guaranty, the wife becomes liable to pay
back the loan. Because the ECOA-as interpreted by the Eighth
Circuit-does not offer a remedy for guarantors, she will not be able to
bring suit under the Act. If the wife is unable to fulfill the payment, she
likely will have to file for bankruptcy and her credit rating will suffer as
a result. With a lower credit rating, the wife will have a more difficult
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time receiving credit in the future, and any credit she does receive will
require the signature of a co-signor or guarantor. In this situation, the
wife finds herself in a position where-because of the discriminatory
actions of a creditor-she is unable to receive credit for herself in the
future.
3. Denying Standing to Guarantors Diminishes the Act's Ability to
Further Congressional Intent.
The ECOA was passed to "protect married women from
discriminatory credit practices and to provide all applicants the
opportunity to establish individual credit."' 32 This protection explicitly
applies to every aspect of a credit transaction. 133 Congress characterized
discrimination based on gender as irrational, and envisioned that the
Board would have significant flexibility in its enforcement of the Act to
prevent any kind of irrational discrimination. 134 As mentioned above,
the Bureau, formerly the Board, is responsible for ensuring that the Act
furthers Congress's intent. 135  Congress entrusted the Board with so
much authority in pursuit of its purpose that Congress removed the
definition of "discrimination" from the original bill so that the Board
would have broad discretion to determine what conduct would be
prohibited. 136  Therefore, including guarantors as applicants under
Regulation B's spousal-guarantor provision was an attempt by the Board
to further the purpose of the Act. The Eighth Circuit's finding should
not be adhered to because it dilutes the Act's original purpose and
undercuts Congress's intent to give the Board deference.
The discrimination that Congress contemplated at the outset of the
ECOA were acts that prevented women from taking part in the credit
process. More generally, Congress sought to "prevent loans from being
conditioned automatically on the securing of the signature of the non-
borrowing spouse."' 137  This general purpose does not contemplate
requiring one spouse's signature over another. The modem forms of
discrimination that have been contested under the Act have concerned
wives who wrongfully have been included in the credit process. Both
this form and the form originally contemplated by Congress are types of
132. See Farley, supra note 4, at 1288.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a).
134. See Miller v. Am. Exp. Co., 688 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing S. Rep. No. 94-589,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 403, 405-06).
135. See supra note 7.
136. See Miller, 688 F.2d at 1238 (citing Conference Report No. 93-1429, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6148, 6152-53).
137. Mayes v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 167 F.3d 675, 676 (1st Cir. 1999).
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discrimination targeted at a spouse. Both reflect marital status
discrimination and, therefore, should be impermissible under the Act.
Without the amendment to the definition of an applicant, creditors
would be able to circumvent the intention of the Act by requiring
women wrongfully to assume liability for a loan. Permitting such
situations, as the Eighth Circuit does, "eliminates entire aspects of the
[Board's] implementation scheme."13 Failure to adhere to the Board's
interpretation would permit creditors to benefit from these
discriminatory practices-a result that Congress never intended.
The flawed interpretations extend down to the district court.139 The
decision in Champion Bank 140 hinders the implementation of the Act's
purpose by ignoring the difference between a spouse that should not
have been made a party to the loan and a spouse that is not party to the
loan. The Champion court is correct in that a spouse who is not party to
a loan cannot seek recovery under the Act. However, a spouse
wrongfully made a guarantor still is a guarantor with the right to all
protections offered by the Act. To accept the argument in Champion
would mean that a spouse, even if wrongfully made a guarantor and
harmed by the actions of a creditor, would not have any remedy under
the Act.
Finally, the court in Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund,
L.P.141 found that "conferring standing upon guarantors places no
additional requirements upon creditors[,]" because it does not subject
the creditor to any additional liability than if the creditor had adhered to
the law in the first place. 142 Creditors are not permitted to require a
spousal guaranty regardless of the definition of an applicant.
143
However, the only change made after the Board's amendments is that
the guarantor can seek to recover for damages from the creditor's
wrongful conduct.
The Board's interpretation of an applicant should not only be afforded
deference, but enactment of this interpretation is essential for the
successful promotion of the Act's purpose. The Eighth Circuit's
reasoning would threaten the gains made by women over the lifetime of
the Act and undermines both the Bureau's ability to create regulation in
the future and the congressional purpose behind the Act.
138. Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Bulk Petroleum Corp., No. 08-CV-654-TCK-PJC, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106495, at*26 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 5, 2010).
139. Champion Bank v. Reg'l Dev., LLC, No. 4:08CV1807 CDP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40468
(E.D. Mo. May 13, 2009).
140. Id. at *8 (arguing that a guarantor could not seek recovery as a guarantor while
simultaneously deny being a guarantor).
141. Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1995).
142. Id. at 33.
143. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1).
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C. The Future of Regulation B
Resolution of the circuit split is critically important for the successful
enforcement of the Act and Regulation B. Resolution is especially
critical for the creditor, because every time the creditor attempts to
collect on a guaranteed loan, someone challenges the enforcement of
this unclear statute. 144 These frequent challenges cause the creditor's
costs of the loan to increase. Without a clear ruling from the Supreme
Court or an amendment to the Act that adopts the Board's definition of
applicant, litigation will only continue to appear under this Act.
1. The Supreme Court
Interpretation by the Supreme Court would be the fastest way for this
issue of law to be resolved. In an attempt to resolve this issue, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hawkins v. Community Bank of
Raymore, and heard arguments on October 5, 2015.145 However,
because of the untimely death of Justice Antonin Scalia, on March 22,
2016, the Supreme Court issued a one-sentence order announcing that
the Court was equally divided on the issue and that the Eighth Circuit
decision was affirmed. 146 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court decision,
which has no precedential value, leaves more questions than answers
and, because Bridgemill has not been appealed to the Supreme Court, a
resolution to this issue does not seem imminent.
2. Statutory Amendment
While Supreme Court review indeed would clarify this area of law, an
amendment to the Act, however, probably would be the most effective.
There is no need for Congress to alter the structure or implementation of
the Act. Instead, an amendment should change the definition of
"applicant" to expressly include guarantors, and, potentially, could read:
"The term 'applicant' means any person[, including a guarantor for the
purpose of the spousal-guaranty provision,] who applies to a creditor
directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, or applies to
a creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an amount
exceeding the previously established credit limit."' 4 7 This change is
similar to the amendment made to Regulation B. While this method of
144. See Patrick Gregory, supra note 116 (quoting an Aug. 8, 2014 interview with Thomas Stahl).
145. Oral Argument, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore (Oct. 5, 2015) (No. 14-520),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/1 4-520_3e04.pdf.
146. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank, 194 L.Ed.2d 163 (U.S. 2016).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b).
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resolution would clarify any ambiguity in this area, the process also
likely would be more complex and require additional time. Regardless
of how the statutory language ultimately is structured, Congress would
want to show clear, explicit intent to include guarantors in the definition
of persons who have standing under the Act.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1985 amendment to Regulation B expanded the definition of an
applicant as it applies to the spousal-guarantor provision. 148
Specifically, it was expanded to include guarantors in the definition of
"applicant."' 149 Recent litigation has questioned if courts are required to
provide deference to the Board's interpretation. The Eighth Circuit held
in Hawkins that the Board's interpretation should not be provided
deference, because the interpretation is contrary to Congress's intent.
The Eighth Circuit found that this, therefore, denied guarantors standing
under the Act. 150 However, in Bridgemill, the Sixth Circuit, as well as
the majority of lower courts, found that Congress has not specifically
addressed the issue of applicants under the spousal-guarantor provision
of Regulation B. 15 1  These courts argue that deference should be
provided to the regulatory agency's interpretation of the statutory
language, because Congress has left gaps in the construction of the Act,
thus resulting in ambiguity. 152 The Board is within its granted authority
to fill the gaps left by Congress with reasonable interpretations of any
ambiguous wording. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit was correct in its
ruling that the Board's interpretation requires deference.
In addition, the Board's interpretation of "applicant" is virtually
required in order to ensure that the Act's purpose is being promoted. If
the interpretation of the Eighth Circuit were to control this area of law,
the purpose of the act would be undercut, the economic and social gains
women have made in the credit process would be threatened, and the
authority of the regulatory agency would be undermined. The policy
behind the Act is to prevent any form of discrimination within any
aspect of the credit process. Accepting the arguments made by the
Eighth Circuit in Hawkins contravenes these policy considerations that
are at the heart of the Act's implementation. Conversely, adopting the
148. See Equal Credit Opportunity; Revision of Regulation B, 50 Fed. Reg. 48018 (Nov. 20,
1985).
149. Id.
150. See Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 942 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015).
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holding from the Sixth Circuit's decision not only supports the purpose
of the Act, but equips the Act to address modem day issues of
discrimination that were unforeseen at the time of the Act's creation.
Moving forward, either the Supreme Court or Congress will need to
resolve this contested issue of statutory interpretation. The best
resolution to this issue will be the adoption of the interpretation of the
Sixth Circuit and a holding that the spousal-guaranty provision of
Regulation B of the ECOA provides standing to guarantors.
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